Search results for "Managerial discretion"
showing 7 items of 7 documents
CEO tenure and ownership mode choice of Chinese firms: The moderating roles of managerial discretion
2014
Abstract Based on upper echelon theory, this study has explored how CEO tenure affects ownership mode choice of Chinese firms investing abroad, and how some organizational factors, such as firm size, firm age and CEO duality, moderate this relationship. Using secondary data, this study finds CEO tenure has a positive relationship with the choice of full control mode, CEO duality can reinforce this relationship, but firm size and firm age have no significant moderating effect.
Behind the curtain of international diversification: An agency theory perspective
2018
This paper dissects the antecedents of international diversification through the lens of the agency cost of free cash flow arguments. It explores whether the partial convergence of interests among managers, majority shareholders, and minority shareholders affects a firm's choice to diversify internationally. Using a sample panel of 60 Italian firms evaluated longitudinally from 2004 to 2014, the study tests whether a firm's international diversification is affected by its free cash flow (as the ultimate source of managerial discretion) and debt (as the main constraint to managerial discretion), especially in firm contexts that exacerbate agency problems. We find that the effects on internat…
Do Powerful CEOs Have an Impact on Microfinance Performance?
2009
In this study we show that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) with more powerful CEOs have higher performance variability. A powerful CEO is defined as one that also chairs the board of directors. CEO power is reflected in higher performance variability if CEOs have more latitude of action, i.e. managerial discretion. Managerial discretion can be limited by having stakeholder electives on the board. We find that CEO power only has an effect on MFI performance variability when there are no stakeholder electives on the board. Furthermore, we argue that CEOs in non-profit MFIs have more discretion, because their dual mission implies their CEOs are harder to control. We find that CEO power increa…
Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance Performance?
2012
Authors version of an article published in Journal of Management Studies. The definitive version is available from Wiley at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2012.01046.x Recently, microfinance has been coming under public and media attacks. The microcredit crisis following from microfinance-induced suicides in 2010 in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh indicates that weak corporate governance and imprudent risk taking have far-reaching consequences. Yet, analyses of corporate governance mechanisms among microfinance institutions (MFIs) remain underdeveloped. As a response, this study examines the impact of CEO power on MFI risk taking by deriving explicit predictions of this effect fr…
Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance Performance?
2012
Recently, microfinance has been coming under public and media attacks. The microcredit crisis following from microfinance-induced suicides in 2010 in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh indicates that weak corporate governance and imprudent risk taking have far-reaching consequences. Yet, analyses of corporate governance mechanisms among microfinance institutions (MFIs) remain underdeveloped. As a response, this study examines the impact of CEO power on MFI risk taking by deriving explicit predictions of this effect from a characterization of the microfinance industry. Based on a sample of 280 microfinance institutions, our results suggest that powerful CEOs of microfinance non-governmental …
Integrated reporting: The mediating role of the board of directors and investor protection on managerial discretion in munificent environments
2018
Is there a relationship between managerial discretion in munificent environments and the propensity to disclose an integrated reporting? Is this relationship contingent on the board of directors and investor protection? For an international sample for 2006–2014, this paper supports the assertion that managers are more able to extract superior perquisites when the level of accumulated cash holding is higher; that is, in munificent contexts. Because of the greater managerial discretion in these contexts, managers show a lower incentive to disclose voluntary information through an integrated report, which decreases the firm's transparency. Nonetheless, the board of directors and the level of i…
À la recherche du lien perdu entre caractéristiques des dirigeants et performance de la firme : gouvernance et latitude managériale
2008
Upper Echelons Theory and financial governance theory both postulate that CEOs have a determining influence on the performance with, however, a very significant difference concerning the influence of managerial discretion. For the first one, managerial discretion has a potentially positive influence on performance by enabling the managers' cognitive capacities to affect it, for the second one, a negative influence, insofar as it can lead to decisions conflicting with shareholders' interests. The objective of this article is, on the one hand, to compare the contents and the role of the managerial discretion concept within these two theoretical frameworks, on the other hand, to propose, in th…